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Abstract—This paper studies the physical layer security (PLS)
of a vehicular network employing a reconfigurable intelligent
surface (RIS). RIS technologies are emerging as an important
paradigm for the realisation of smart radio environments, where
large numbers of small, low-cost and passive elements, reflect the
incident signal with an adjustable phase shift without requiring
a dedicated energy source. Inspired by the promising potential
of RIS-based transmission, we investigate two vehicular network
system models: One with vehicle-to-vehicle communication with
the source employing a RIS-based access point, and the other
model in the form of a vehicular adhoc network (VANET), with
a RIS-based relay deployed on a building. Both models assume
the presence of an eavesdropper, to investigate the average secrecy
capacity of the considered systems. Monte-Carlo simulations are
provided throughout to validate the results. The results show
that performance of the system in terms of the secrecy capacity
is affected by the location of the RIS-relay and the number of
RIS cells. The effect of other system parameters such as source
power and eavesdropper distances are also studied.
Index Terms—Double-Rayleigh fading channels, physical layer
security, reconfigurable intelligent surfaces, secrecy capacity,
vehicular communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research in beyond 5G technologies has brought
about new communication paradigms, especially at the phys-
ical layer. One of such emerging paradigms is the concept
of “smart radio environments”, enabled by technologies to
control the propagation environment in order to improve signal
quality and coverage, such as reflector-arrays/intelligent walls
and reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) [1], [2]. RISs
are man-made surfaces of electromagnetic material that are
electronically controlled with integrated electronics and have
unique wireless communication capabilities [3].
RIS-based transmission concepts have been shown to be
completely different from existing MIMO, beamforming and
amplify-and-forward/decode-and-forward relaying paradigms,
where the large number of small, low-cost and passive el-
ements on a RIS only reflect the incident signal with an
adjustable phase shift without requiring a dedicated energy
source for RF processing or retransmission [4]. Applications of
RIS have recently been investigated with respect to signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) maximisation [4], improving signal coverage
[5], improving massive MIMO systems [6], beamforming
optimisation [7]–[9], as well as multi-user networks [10].
On the other hand, physical layer security (PLS) in vehicular
networks is important due to rapid advancements towards au-
tonomous vehicles and smart/cognitive transportation networks
to minimise the risk from compromise. Significant research
efforts have been expended in studying vehicular networks
with [11] or without PLS [12]–[15]. Given that PLS employs
the inherent characteristics of the propagation channels, such
as interference, fading and noise to realise keyless secure
transmission through signal processing approaches [2], then
RIS-based systems are well positioned for such applications.
Initial results have been reported for PLS studies for systems
employing RIS technologies [16], [17]. However, no such
studies have been conducted for vehicular adhoc networks
(VANETs).
From the aforementioned, this study presents the following
contributions. We study the PLS of two possible vehicular
network models, by analysing and deriving expressions for the
average secrecy capacity. The first model considers a vehicle-
to-vehicle (V2V) network with the source vehicle employing
a RIS-based access point (AP) for transmission. In the second
model, we consider a VANET with a source station transmis-
sion via a RIS-based relay. Such a RIS-relay could be deployed
on a building as part of a smart infrastructure within a city. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis of a RIS-
based technology employed within a VANET. Moreover, the
distances of the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes are taking
into account along with realistic fading scenarios considered
for the base stations and the mobile nodes. Monte Carlo sim-
ulations are provided throughout to verify the accuracy of our
analysis. The results show that the performance of the system
in terms of the secrecy capacity is improved with the use of the
RIS. Furthermore, the effect of the system parameters such as
source power, eavesdropper distance and number of RIS cells
on the system performance are investigated.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sections II and III,
we describe the two system models under study and anal-
yse the secrecy performance by deriving accurate analytical
expressions for efficient computation of the secrecy capacity
of the networks. Finally, in Sections IV and V, we present
the results with discussions and outline the main conclusions,
respectively.
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Figure 1: System model for V2V scenario with the source vehicle using
RIS as AP.
Figure 2: Vehicle RIS configuration as an AP.
II. V2V WITH RIS AS ACCESS POINT
In this section, we describe the V2V network with RIS as
AP and derive expressions for the average secrecy capacity of
the system.
A. System Description
We consider a system of vehicles operating in a network as
shown in Fig. 1. We assume a classic Wyner’s wiretap model
in our analysis [18], such that an information source vehicle
(S), sends confidential information to a destination vehicle
(D), while a passive eavesdropper1 vehicle (E) attempts to
receive and decode the confidential information. The vehicles
D and E are known to lie within a certain radius from S, the
precise relative distances of the V2V links are unknown during
transmission, which is a realistic assumption for a network
of this nature [11], [19]. Moreover, S is assumed to employ
a RIS-based scheme in the form of an AP to communicate
over the network2. As shown in the block diagram of Fig. 2,
the RIS can be connected over a wired link or optical fiber
for direct transmission from S, and can support transmission
without RF processing. For the system considered, we assume
an intelligent AP with the RIS having knowledge of channel
phase terms, such that the RIS-induced phases can be adjusted
to maximise the received SNR through appropriate phase
cancellations and proper alignment of reflected signals from
the intelligent surface.
1Passive eavesdropper in the sense that the node only intercepts the
information, but makes no attempt to actively disrupt, such as through
jamming.
2Initial proposal and results for such a configuration of intelligent surfaces
were reported in [4].
The received signals at D and E are respectively represented
as
yD =
[
N∑
n=1
hD,ne
−jφn
]
x+ wD, (1)
yE =
[
N∑
n=1
hE,ne
−jφn
]
x+ wE , (2)
where x represents the transmitted signal by S with power
Ps, while the terms wD and wE are the respective additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at D and E. Without loss
of generality, we denote the power spectral density of the
AWGN as N0 and equal at both links. The terms hi,n =√
gi,nr
−β
i , i ∈ {D,E}, is the channel coefficient from S
to the receiving vehicles D and E, where ri is the V2V link
distance, β is the path-loss exponent and gi,n is the channel
gain from the RIS to the receiver, following independent
double Rayleigh fading [11]. The term φn is the reconfigurable
phase induced by the nth reflector of the RIS, which through
phase matching, the SNR of the received signals can be
maximised3.
Based on (1) and (2), the instanstaneous SNRs at D and E
are given by
γD =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hD,n |2
N0
, (3)
and
γE =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hE,n |2
N0
. (4)
B. Average Secrecy Capacity Analysis
In this section, we derive analytical expressions for the
secrecy capacity of the system. The maximum achievable
secrecy capacity is defined by [20]
Cs = max {CD − CE , 0} , (5)
where CD = log2 (1 + γD) and CE = log2 (1 + γE) are
the instantaneous capacities of the main and eavesdropping
links, respectively. The secrecy capacity in (5) can therefore
be expressed as [20]
Cs =
{
log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γE) , γD > γE ,
0, γD < γE .
(6)
The average secrecy capacity Cs is given by [21]
Cs = E [Cs (γD, γE)]
=
∞ˆ
0
∞ˆ
0
Cs (γD, γE) f (γD, γE) dγDdγE , (7)
where E [·] is the expectation operator and f (γD, γE) is the
joint PDF of γD and γE . In order to simplify the analysis, we
3For the sake of brevity, the reader is referred to [4], for details of phase
cancellation techniques.
express the logarithmic function in (5) in an alternate form.
Recalling the identity [22, Eq. (6)]
ln (1 + ζ) =
∞ˆ
0
1
s
(
1− e−ζs) e−sds, (8)
and by substituting ζ = γD in (8), we can express the
instantaneous capacity of the main link as
CD =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−MD (z)) e−zdz, (9)
whereMD (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gD,n
]
is the MGF of the
SNR at D.
Next, we compute the MGF MD (z), defined by
MD (z) =E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gD,n
]
=
N∏
n=1
E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
D
N0
gD,n
]
=
N∏
n=1
ˆ
g
e−zξDgD,nfgD (g)dgD, (10)
then from the generalized cascaded Rayleigh distribution, we
can obtain the PDF of the double Rayleigh channel for n = 2
in [23, Eq. (8)] as f (g) = G2,00,2
(
1
4g
2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12
)
. By invoking
[24, Eq. (9.34.3)], we can express the PDF by re-writing the
Meijer G-function in an alternate form. Thus, we get
f (g) = G2,00,2
(
1
4
g2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12
)
= gK0 (g) . (11)
Using (11) and [24, Eq. (6.621.3)] along with some basic
algebraic manipulations, we can obtain the desired result as
MD (z) =
N∏
n=1
4
3(1 + z
Psr
−β
D
N0
)2
2F1
2, 1
2
,
5
2
,
z
Psr
−β
D
N0
− 1
z
Psr
−β
D
N0
+ 1
 .
(12)
Using similar analysis, the average capacity of the eaves-
dropper link can be represented as
CE =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−ME (z)) e−zdz, (13)
where the MGF ME (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
E
N0
∑N
n=1 gE
]
and can
be similarly evaluated as
ME (z) =
N∏
n=1
4
3(1 + z
Psr
−β
E
N0
)2
2F1
2, 1
2
,
5
2
,
z
Psr
−β
E
N0
− 1
z
Psr
−β
E
N0
+ 1
 .
(14)
From (6), (9), (12) - (14), the average secrecy capacity can
be represented as (15), shown at the top of the this page.
Figure 3: System model for a vehicular network scenario. Source station
using building-mounted-RIS as relay for vehicular communication.
III. VANET TRANSMISSION THROUGH RIS RELAY
In this section, we describe the VANET system transmitting
through a RIS relay and derive expressions for the average
secrecy capacity of the system.
A. System Description
In this section, we consider an RIS-based scheme with the
RIS employed as a relay or reflector for vehicular nodes in
the network. Fig. 3 illustrates the RIS-based system under
consideration. The RIS is deployed on a building and used
as a relay for the signal from stationary source S, while D
and E are assumed to be highly mobile vehicular nodes. Under
this assumption, the source-to-RIS channel gs is assumed to
be Rayleigh faded, while the RIS-to-destination and RIS-to-
eavesdropper fading channels, gD and gE are assumed to
be double-Rayleigh distributed. The RIS is in the form of a
reflect-array comprising N reconfigurable reflector elements,
capable of being controlled by a communication oriented
software for intelligent transmission. With this in mind, the
received signals at D and E are
yi =
[
N∑
n=1
hshi,ne
−jφn
]
x+ wi, (16)
where hs,n =
√
gs,nr
−β
s e−jθn is the source-to-RIS chan-
nel with distance rs, phase component θn and gs fol-
lowing a Rayleigh fading distribution. The term hi,n =√
gi,nr
−β
i e
−jψn , i ∈ {D,E}, is the channel coefficient
from RIS-to-vehicle node, with distance ri, path-loss exponent
β, phase component ψn and gi,n following a double-Rayleigh
distribution to model the mobility of the nodes. [11]. The
instanstaneous SNRs at D and E are given respectively by
γrD =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hs,n |2| hD,n |2
N0
(17)
and
γrE =
∑N
n=1 Ps | hs,n |2| hE,n |2
N0
(18)
Cs =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e−z

1−
 43(N0 + zPsr−βD )2 2F1
(
2,
1
2
,
5
2
,
zPsr
−β
D −N0
zPsr
−β
D +N0
)
N
−
1−
 43(N0 + zPsr−βE )2 2F1
(
2,
1
2
,
5
2
,
zPsr
−β
E −N0
zPsr
−β
E +N0
)
N
 dz. (15)
B. Average Secrecy Capacity Analysis
From (9), we obtain the average capacity for the destination
V2V link as
CD,r =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−MD,r (z)) e−zdz, (19)
where MD,r (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gs,ngD,n
]
is the
MGF of the SNR at D. As for the joint distribution of
gs and gD, given that gs is a Rayleigh RV and gD is a
double-Rayleigh RV, we can define the RV g = gsgD, which
follows the cascaded Rayleigh distribution with n = 3. From
the generalized cascaded Rayleigh distribution [23], we can
evaluate the PDF of g as
f (g) =
1√
2
G3,00,3
(
1
8
g2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12 ,12
)
. (20)
Thus, the MD,r (z) is given by
MD,r (z) =E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
∑N
n=1 gs,ngD,n
]
=
N∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
e−zg
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0 fg(g)dg
=
N∏
n=1
∞ˆ
0
1√
2
e−zg
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0 G3,00,3
(
1
8
g2
∣∣∣∣∣ −12 ,12 ,12
)
dg.
(21)
Using (20) and [24, Eq. (7.813.2)] along with some basic
algebraic manipulations, we can obtain the MGF as
MD,r (z) =
N∏
n=1
1
zµd
√
2pi
G3,22,3
(
1
2 (zµd)
2
∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)
, (22)
where µd =
Psr
−β
s r
−β
D
N0
. Using similar analysis, the average
capacity of the eavesdropper link can be represented as
CE,r =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
(1−ME,r (z)) e−zdz, (23)
where the MGF ME,r (z) = E
[
e−z
Psr
−β
s r
−β
E
N0
∑N
n=1 gs,ngE,n
]
and can be similarly evaluated as
ME,r (z) =
N∏
n=1
1
zµe
√
2pi
G3,22,3
(
1
2 (zµe)
2
∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)
, (24)
where µe =
Psr
−β
s r
−β
e
N0
.
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Figure 4: Average secrecy capacity versus source transmit power Ps for
the V2V network with RIS as AP. Parameters considered with varying
eavesdropper distance rE and number of RIS cells N .
From (6), (19), (22) - (24), the average secrecy capacity can
be represented as (25), shown at the top of the next page.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present and discuss some results from
the mathematical expressions derived in the paper. We then
investigate the effect of key parameters on the secrecy capacity
of the system. The results are then verified using Monte
Carlo simulations with at least 106 iterations. Unless otherwise
stated, we have assumed source power Ps = 10W, RIS-to-D
distance rD = 4m, RIS-to-E distance rE = 8m, source-to-RIS
distance rs = 10m and pathloss exponent β = 2.7.
In Fig. 4, we commence analysis for the V2V network
model, with the average secrecy capacity against source power
for different numbers of RIS cells and eavesdropper distances.
It can be observed that the secrecy capacity increases with an
increase in Ps, rE or N . It can be further noted that within
the region considered, the eavesdropper distance has a greater
effect on the secrecy capacity than doubling the number of
RIS cells. Also, the effect of increased RIS cells, is more
pronounced when the eavesdropper is further away. A similar
analysis can be made for the average secrecy capacity of
the VANET RIS-relay model considered, as observed in Fig.
5. However, the effect of increased source power produces
an almost linear response for the secrecy capacity, while the
Cs,r =
1
ln (2)
∞ˆ
0
1
z
e−z
1−{ N0√
2pizPsr
−β
s r
−β
D
G3,22,3
(
1
2
(
N0
zPsr
−β
s r
−β
D
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)}N
−
1−{ N0
zPsr
−β
s r
−β
E
√
2pi
G3,22,3
(
1
2
(
N0
zPsr
−β
s r
−β
E
)2 ∣∣∣∣∣ 0, 1212 ,12 ,12
)}N dz. (25)
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Figure 5: Average secrecy capacity versus source transmit power Ps
for the VANET with RIS as relay. Parameters considered with varying
eavesdropper distance rE and number of RIS cells N .
effective value of the secrecy capacity is much lower than the
V2V RIS model for similar Ps.
Fig. 6, shows a plot of the average secrecy capacity against
rs with different values of Ps and N , for the VANET RIS-
relay system. We assume the RIS-to-eavesdropper distance
rE = 12m. First, we observe that the average secrecy capacity
decreases as the source distance increases, demonstrating the
effect of fading and pathloss on the link, before the RIS relay.
The result also demonstrates that doubling the number of
RIS cells has less influence on the average secrecy capacity,
as compared to the impact of the source power, within the
observed region.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examined the secrecy capacity as a
key metric for PLS of a wireless vehicular communication
network. Two scenarios of a RIS-based vehicular network were
considered. The results demonstrate how the secrecy capacity
of a vehicular network can be improved with respect to the
source power, eavesdropper distance and the number of RIS
cells. The results further showed how the location and size of
RIS (in terms of number of RIS cells) can be employed to
improve a RIS relay-based VANET.
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